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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Islamic finance has shown resilience in a challenging 
international financial environment. It focuses on 
the principles of economic prosperity and social and 
economic justice (Setiawan, 2006). This resulted in a 
massive shift from conventional to Islamic banking 
($2 trillion of total assets (Economist, 2014) with an 
annual growth of 19.7% a year to 2018) (Al-Deehani 
et al., 2015). 
One example of the shift from conventional 
banking to Islamic banking is manifested in the 
adoption of Sukuk vs conventional bonds. Sukuk are 
the Islamic version of bonds and they are based on 
profit and loss sharing rather than providing a fixed 
income to its holders. It is shown that sukuk issuers 
have better performance than their matched bond 
issuers, but that sukuk contributes to reducing the 
gap in performance over time (Klein et al., 2018). 
One example of equity financing in the Islamic 
jargon is profit and loss sharing contracts known as 
Musharakah (where all parties contribute with 
capital) or Mudaraba (where the financier is the only 
provider of capital). 
Profit and loss sharing contracts in Islamic 
finance are partnership contracts between 
financier(s) and an entrepreneur(s) characterized by 
two main distinctive features. First profits are 
shared on a pre-agreed ratio (Obaidullah, 2005). 
Second losses are born according to each one’s ratio 
of the project’s capital. Parties must enter into the 
contract with their full consent (Usmani & Ansari, 
2010). Each of the parties involved contributes with 
capital and one or some of the members are 
designated as managers (Ward, 2010). Partners can 
as well agree to give extra remuneration to another 
party (Obaidullah, 2005).  
In Musharakah contract, no one part can 
demand guarantees against losses. Recourse to a 
guarantee can be made only in case of managerial 
mismanagement. 
Musharakah offers the parties the right to 
gradually transfer ownership to the other parties 
through a process called diminishing Musharakah 
(Musharakah mutanaqisah) (Ward, 2010). 
Islamic market indices (Abidi, 2009) and 
Islamic windows have been set to show the 
Importance of Musharakh products. It is reported 
that in the global Islamic financial services industry 
stood at US$2.293 trillion by the end of 2016 (Dubai 
Islamic Bank, 2017). 
As it will be apparent in the literature review, 
PLS contracts in Islamic finance, suffer from 
asymmetric information more than conventional 
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equity contracts. The motivation is then to reduce 
asymmetric information, specifically moral hazards 
in the form of an entrepreneur’s low effort. Because 
of this behavioural aspect manifested in these 
contracts, we found it suitable to apply game theory 
techniques as opposed to traditional techniques. 
This type of contracts raises the relational issue 
between holders of funds and entrepreneurs. These 
issues can be addressed from the perspective of 
agency theory (principal-agent relations). 
Nabi (2013) in his work tries to reduce moral 
hazard by combatting the shirking behaviour of the 
financed entrepreneur. We extended his work by 
applying a repeated incentive mechanism model. We 
strive to sustain cooperation between the financier 
and the entrepreneur over a certain period using a 
specific incentive mechanism. We also try to find the 
optimum period, called duration, over which the 
project can be undertaken.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Many conventional contracts have tackled the 
asymmetric information case. However, some of 
these are not acceptable from an Islamic point of 
view. For example, in a conventional setting, 
collateral is used by managers to signal their 
efficient type (Berger et al., 2011). This is not 
allowed in Islamic finance as no guarantee is to be 
provided against losses. 
Another method, used in a conventional equity 
contract, is the willingness of entrepreneurs to sign 
for a low job protection to signal their efficient type 
Subramanian (Subramanian et al., 2002). This is again 
not allowed in Islamic finance as signing for a low 
job protection is seen as a guarantee against losses. 
This raises a major issue in terms of the safety 
of the capital provided to the entrepreneur. Without 
capital guarantees, Islamic banking might not extend 
mudharaba or musharakah to entrepreneurs. The 
safety of the capital has to be ensured in any 
investment made. Without any capital guarantee, 
Islamic banking usually will not want to offer 
Mudaraba or Musharakah contract to clients. The 
non-provision of capital guarantee is in line with the 
Islamic Jurisprudence (Janor, Yakob, Hashim, 
Zanariah & Wei, 2016). 
The non-provision of capital guarantee is very 
attractive to clients especially if they are at the early 
growth stage of their business. This is because 
clients with the long track in business are confident 
in their business standing and therefore do not 
favour sharing profits with other financiers. On the 
other side, clients with low expertise level, do not 
want t risk the totality of their capital and therefore 
prefer sharing losses in the event of adverse market 
conditions. This is a major challenge to Islamic 
banks. If the demand for Musharakah and Mudaraba 
financing is made by big corporations that have a 
solid business track record, more of such financings 
could be offered. However, the demand from the 
high-risk small and medium companies is not a valid 
reason for Islamic banks to refuse to provide 
Musharakah financing; and thus, eliminate the spirit 
of Islamic banks of being fair to all. 
Another major challenge in Islamic banking 
contracts is the selection of the right partner 
(entrepreneur) for whom financing is to be provided. 
Islamic financial institutions are not charitable 
institutions and the selection of the right partner 
should equally be likely on the basis of social as well 
as monetary grounds. Islamic banks can still offer 
Mudaraba and Musharakah financings to small 
companies as long as the partners or the companies 
are able to convince them through the planning and 
operation of the business that they have the 
potential to be jointly developed. 
Profit and loss sharing contracts such as 
Modaraba and Musharakah are classified as a high-
risk investment. This is due to their high probability 
of failure. Many factors contribute to such high risk. 
One of such factors is the lack of the entrepreneurial 
expertise. This put the Islamic bank in a high risky 
position as, not only that, it has to protect the funds 
of depositors but also insure them a steady and 
competitive rate of return. If losses occur, the 
Islamic bank has to replace the funds used. So, a 
cautious treatment of application files has to be 
taken into consideration. Many points must be 
considered before considering the financing through 
profit and loss sharing contracts: production costs, 
demand, market competition, industry conditions. 
These methods can greatly reduce the risk of 
asymmetric information between the entrepreneur 
and the Islamic bank. 
Like any other form of equity financing, profit 
and loss sharing contracts suffer from contractual 
disputes. Preliminary findings indicate that 
businessmen often fail to plan exchange 
relationships completely, and seldom use legal 
sanctions to adjust these relationships or to settle 
disputes (Macaulay, 1963). Despite these facts, it is 
claimed that the preferred financial instrument is 
currently the profit-participating loan (Hornuf, 
Klohn & Schilling, 2018) such as profit and loss 
sharing contracts. 
Regraded as forms of equity financing, PLS 
contracts, named Musharakah in Islamic finance, are 
different from traditional conventional equity 
financing in many aspects. Two of the main 
differences are the sharing of profits and the 
sharing of losses. In Islamic finance, the sharing of 
losses must be determined according to a 
predetermined ratio before the start of the financed 
project. This is different from the conventional 
framework where sharing can be dictated according 
to the financier outlook of the project. In a 
conventional setting, changing the profit-sharing 
ratio can also be dictated by the financier in case of 
adverse market conditions.  
From another angle, in Islamic finance, losses 
must be born according to each participant’s capital 
contribution. This is different from conventional 
equity contracts were the financier might dictate a 
maximum loss leaving the entrepreneur to bear the 
rest. Also, in Islamic finance, the entrepreneur is not 
to provide guarantees against losses while in a 
conventional system this can be allowed.  
From the two points above, it is clear that 
profit and loss contracts in Islamic finance are 
subject to more restrictions compared to their 
conventional counterpart. They are, however, ethical 
forms of financing as participants share profits and 
bear losses collaboratively. 
Because of the many restrictions manifested on 
the PLS contracts, this makes them more subject to 
asymmetric information compared to their 
conventional counterparts. In fact, many gaps are 
still to be covered in the literature regarding 
Musharakh product which is a form of equity 
financing. Some of these gaps include capital 
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structure and treatment of asymmetric information 
in Musharakah (Chatti & Yousfi, 2010). 
Profit and loss sharing contracts are considered 
as fair economic contracts as they entail the sharing 
of profit as well as the sharing of losses. This in 
contradiction, for example, to a model provided by 
(Mitra, 2018) where local middleman earn excessive 
extra profits compared to other agents. 
Credit bureaus use information sharing to 
tackle the issue of information asymmetry between 
financiers and entrepreneurs. This is because it has 
been reported that such methods increase 
borrowers' effort in managing projects (Padilla & 
Pagano, 1997). This method as well helps in 
loosening competition between banks (Gehrig & 
Stenbacka, 2007). The intensity of information is 
higher when the mobility of the borrower increases 
(Pagaon & Jappelli, 1993) and the likelihood of 
asymmetric information increases (Brown & 
Zehnder, 2010). It has been shown empirically that 
information sharing is correlated with higher access 
to credit (Pagaon & Jappelli, 1993), and in countries 
with lower creditors rights (Djankov et al., 2007; 
Hertzberg et al., 2011). Banking relationships are 
however destroyed from information sharing (Padilla 
& Pagano, 1997) resulting in a weaker banking 
competition.  
Musharakah contracts suffer from the moral 
hazard problem of misreporting profits compared to 
standard conventional loans. Therefore, more due 
diligence is required (Al-Suwailem, 2006). It is also 
argued that providing collateral and a capital 
contribution by the entrepreneur can reduce this 
problem (Karim, 2002). Providing collateral against 
performance is not permissible in Islamic finance. 
Some of the issues resulting in moral hazards, 
in conventional contracts, relate to the unfair 
distribution of profits among participants (Shaikh, 
2011). For example, the financier in a conventional 
contract may demand a higher return to compensate 
for the risk undertaken. This can lead to a less 
entrepreneurial motivation to run projects. So, to 
deal with such issue, one research suggested 
different incentives in line with the project's risks 
(Jaffar, 2010) and the application of two sharing 
ratios for each partner (Maheran, 2010).  
Nabi (2013), in his work, tries to reduce moral 
hazard by combatting the shirking behaviour of the 
financed entrepreneur. He proposes that to reduce 
moral hazards, it is necessary that the entrepreneur 
provides a minimum financial contribution and that 
a minimum profit-sharing ration is determined in 
advance. Our paper differs in that it proposes 
flexibility in terms of either negotiating on the 
capital contribution or the profit-sharing ratio.  
The benefits of profit and loss sharing 
contracts have been shown through an investigating 
experiment. This experiment investigates the impact 
of Revenue-Sharing and Cost-Sharing offered by a 
retailer on a manufacturer's carbon emission 
abatement efforts and the two firms’ profitability in 
a linear demand setting when consumer 
environmental awareness and carbon tax arise it was 
found that both Revenue sharing and cost Sharing 
can improve system efficiency and manufacturer's 
incentive for abatement (Yang, 2018). 
In a previous paper (EL Fakir & Tkiouat, 2015a) 
of ours, we have proposed an incentive mechanism 
to reduce asymmetric information. This mechanism 
results in higher social value and more 
entrepreneurial negotiation power in terms of the 
profit-sharing ratio. The model, however, does not 
provide for two contracts type as the current model 
does.  
In order to assess the viability PLS contracts 
versus other modes of financing such as ROSCA and 
debt-finance, we have proposed in a previous paper 
a new model called ROMCA (EL Fakir & Tkiouat, 
2016). Our Simulation results show that our rotating 
Musharakah model, ROMCA, prevails against debt 
finance when it comes to employment generation, 
wealth creation, and consumption. It becomes even 
dominant under cases of adverse random shocks 
with low market conditions and prevailed in cases of 
moral hazards (EL Fakir & Tkiouat, 2016).  
In dealing with adverse selection and moral 
hazards, some series of publications use two 
contracts. The purpose is to allow for agents type 
separation. In the first paper, we suggested using 
two types of contracts: one is effort based and the 
second is output based. Theoretical evidence showed 
that an effort-based contract can give higher 
compensation to the agent as this contract offers a 
lower sharing ratio to the financier (EL Fakir & 
Tkiouat, 2015b). This result emphasises two 
important Islamic concepts. First, it emphasizes the 
sentiment of altruism which the financier shows by 
taking a smaller profit-sharing ratio. Second, it 
emphasizes the sentiment of positive reciprocity 
which the agent exhibits by providing high effort.  
In the second paper, we tried to reduce the 
adverse selection with respect to Mudaraba using a 
model of two contracts combined with adverse 
selection index for each contract. We have managed 
to develop three types of indices that can help 
financial institutions in their agent selection process 
(EL Fakir & Tkiouat, 2016a). These indices can be 
useful in separating efficient entrepreneurs from 
inefficient ones. 
In the third paper, we tried to use a two-
contract concept in a game theoretical approach 
under incomplete information. We wanted to test 
whether menu contracting (where the entrepreneur 
has the choice between high risk and low risk 
projects, is better than single contracting (where the 
entrepreneur is Offred one kind of projects). Menu 
contracting was found not to be always the optimal 
option for moral hazard reduction (EL Fakir & 
Tkiouat, 2016b). 
 
3. THE MODEL 
 
We try to extend the model of Lone & Quadir (2017). 
We aim at reducing moral hazard in a profit and loss 
sharing agreement involving a financier and an 
entrepreneur. Both parties are risk neutral. The 
entrepreneur wants to finance of a project that costs 
F. The entrepreneur is to contribute with an amount 
“f”. The entrepreneur's effort is a key to the success 
of the project. The project is expected to yield an 
output R where the share of the entrepreneur is R
e
 
and the share of the financier is R
f
 such that R = R
e
 + 
R
f
. This output can take upper and lower values 
depending on the effort being taken. In fact, the 
output can be 𝑅 ̅ with probability θ
h
, in case of high 
effort, or low output value R with probability θ
l
, in 
case of low effort. Such that θ
h
 > θ
l
 regardless of the 
entrepreneurial effort the project, however, can still 
yield a zero income in both high effort and low 
effort resulting in the total investment loss F. The 
project is expected to yield an upper and lower NPV 
depending on effort level as:  
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𝑁𝑃𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =  𝜃ℎ𝑅 −  𝐹 >  0 (1) 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 =  𝜃𝑙𝑅 −  𝐹 + 𝑆 <  0 (2) 
 
Assumption 1: We assume that under equation 
2 the NPV is negative even if the entrepreneur enjoys 
some private benefits S when he performs a low 
effort. 
 
3.1. One stage game 
 
We start by a one stage contract. The sharing 
contract is formulated as (x; F, α, β=x) such that α(β) 
is financier profit share (loss share) and X represents 
the financier capital contribution ratio as described 
by Nabi (2013). 
For the entrepreneur to perform a high effort 
we must have: 
 
𝜃ℎ(1 −  𝛼)(𝑅 −  𝐹 )  −  (1 −  𝛽)(1 −  𝜃ℎ)𝐹 ≥  𝜃𝑙(1 −  𝛼)(𝑅 −  𝐹 )  −  (1 −  𝛽)(1 − 𝜃𝑙 )𝐹 +  𝑆 (3) 
 
3.1.1. Case 1: Fixing β and negotiating on α 
 
Since the financier gets R
e
= α. R we can figure out the 
maximum share α that the financier can get to 
induce the entrepreneur to perform a high effort. 
This means that given a specified capital share 
contribution β provided by the financier, we get: 
 
𝛼 ≤ 1 −
𝑆
∆𝜃 −
(1 − 𝛽)𝐹
𝑅 − 𝐹
 (4) 
 
This maximum α must ensure that the financier 
is at least breaking even i.e.: 
 
𝜃ℎ𝛼. 𝑅 −  𝛽(1 −  𝜃ℎ). 𝐹 ≥  0 (5) 
 
Rearranging for α we get: 
 
𝛼 ≥
𝛽(1 − 𝜃ℎ)𝐹
𝜃ℎ(𝑅 − 𝐹)
 
 (6) 
 
So, for a given β and remembering the fact that 
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 we can deduce upper and lower values for α 
to be incentive compatible for both the entrepreneur 
and the financier: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 [0;
𝛽(1 − 𝜃ℎ)𝐹
𝜃ℎ(𝑅 − 𝐹)
 ] ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛[1;  1 −
𝑆
∆𝜃 −
(1 − 𝛽)𝐹
𝑅 − 𝐹
]  
(7) 
 
3.1.2. Case 2: Fixing α and negotiating on β 
 
Also, if we fix α we can infer automatically the 
maximum capital share contribution β of the 
financier to motivate the entrepreneur to perform a 
higher effort by rearranging the right-hand side 
of (7). i.e.: 
 
𝛽 ≤ 1 −
𝑆
∆𝜃 − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑅 − 𝐹)
𝐹
 (8) 
 
Consequently, we can determine the minimum 
β that will allow the financier to break even by 
rearranging the left-hand side of (7) i.e.: 
 
𝛽 ≤
𝛼𝜃ℎ(𝑅 −  𝐹 ) 
(1 − 𝜃ℎ)𝐹
 
 (9) 
 
We conclude from (8) and (9) and from the fact 
that: 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, that for the capital share to be 
compatible for both, the entrepreneur and the 
financier, under the fixing of α we must have:  
 
0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛 [1;  
𝛼𝜃ℎ(𝑅 −  𝐹 )
(1 − 𝜃ℎ)𝐹
; 1 −
𝑆
∆𝜃 −
(1 − 𝛼)(𝑅 − 𝐹)
𝐹
]  
(10) 
 
3.2. Repeated game 
 
We extend the previous analysis into a repeated 
game by considering the two cases above. 
 
3.2.1. Case 1: Fixing β and negotiating on α 
 
Under this case, we fix the capital contribution ratio 
β at the beginning of the period and deduce α as 
in (7). Then we gradually reduce the financier’s 
capital contribution ratio by an increment dβ at each 
round as long as the agent is cooperating by 
providing a high effort. The reduction of the 
financier capital share β represents an incentive for 
the entrepreneur to sustain cooperation as he holds 
more capital gradually. Using an appropriate 
discount factor δ, the returns to the financier and 
the entrepreneur from sustaining cooperation over 
an N period can be given respectively as: 
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𝑅𝑓𝑁 = 𝑅𝑓
𝛿𝑁+1 − 𝛿
𝛿 − 1
− 𝑑𝛽. 𝐹
𝛿2 − 𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
− (𝑁 − 1)𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
 
(11) 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑁 = 𝑅𝑒
𝛿𝑁+1 − 𝛿
𝛿 − 1
+ 𝑑𝛽. 𝐹
𝛿2 − 𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
− (𝑁 − 1)𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
 
(12) 
 
Where we can name INC the incentive over the 
period N to sustain cooperation: 
 
INC = 𝑑𝛽. 𝐹
𝛿2 − 𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
− (𝑁 − 1)𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
 
(13) 
 
We should remark from (11) and (12) that the 
incentive, INC, is taken off the financier payoff and 
transferred to the entrepreneur over the N period.  
 
3.2.2. Case 2: Fixing α and Negotiating on β 
 
Under this case, we fix the profit-sharing ratio α at 
the beginning of the period and deduce β as in (10). 
Then we reduce the profit-sharing ratio by an 
increment dα at each round as long as the agent is 
cooperating. The reduction of the financier profit 
share α represents an incentive for the entrepreneur 
to sustain cooperation. Using an appropriate 
discount factor δ, we can deduce the return the 
financier and the entrepreneur respectively from 
sustaining cooperation over an N period as: 
 
𝑅𝑓𝑁 = 𝑅𝑓
𝛿𝑁+1 − 𝛿
𝛿 − 1
− 𝑑𝛼 (𝑅 − 𝐹).
𝛿2 − 𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
− (𝑁 − 1)𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
 
(14) 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑁 = 𝑅𝑒
𝛿𝑁+1 − 𝛿
𝛿 − 1
+ 𝑑𝛼 (𝑅 − 𝐹).
𝛿2 − 𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
− (𝑁 − 1)𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
 
(15) 
 
Where we can name INC the incentive over the 
period N to sustain cooperation: 
 
INC = 𝑑𝛼 (𝑅 − 𝐹).
𝛿2 − 𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
− (𝑁 − 1)𝛿𝑁+1
1 − 𝛿
 
(16) 
 
Similarly to the first case, we should remark 
from (14) and (15) that the incentive, INC, is taken 
off the financier payoff and transferred to the 
entrepreneur over the N period. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND NUMERICAL SIMULATION 
 
4.1. The duration problem 
 
Using the above cases, we have managed to decide 
under each case on the appropriate incentive to 
sustain cooperation from the part of the 
entrepreneur. The problem that is left is what the 
optimum period to end the project is. What we mean 
by optimum period is that period that enables the 
financier to maximize its NPV. Mathematically, the 
duration, D, is that period under which: 
 
𝑑(𝑁𝑃𝑉)
𝑑𝑡
= 0 (17) 
 
And 
 
𝑑2(𝑁𝑃𝑉)
𝑑2𝑡
< 0 (18) 
 
We provide a numerical simulation of our 
analysis for each of the two cases above. The 
following table provides the initial values for our 
simulation. We should note however that these 
parameters should ensure that under low effort a 
negative NPV of the project is realized. 
 
Table 1. The simulation initial parameters 
 
F 500 
R 1000 
θ
h
 80% 
θ
l
 30% 
Β 50% 
Α 50% 
𝛿 5% 
dβ 10% 
dα 10% 
 
4.1.1. Case 1: Fixing β and negotiating on α 
 
The following table and graph show the result of the 
simulation. The NPV of the financier increases up to 
a certain duration period and then start to decrease. 
It is easy to approximate the graph function using a 
polynomial equation as shown on the graph. We can 
then calculate the duration and ultimately the 
corresponding incentive to sustain cooperation.  
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Figure 1. NPV under different project life and Case 1 (Fixing β and negotiating on α) 
 
 
NPV Period 
371.838 1 
633.852 2 
797.88 3 
872.244 4 
864.858 5 
783.228 6 
634.452 7 
425.22 8 
161.814 9 
-149.892 10 
-504.432 11 
-896.748 12 
-1322.19 13 
-1776.516 14 
-2255.892 15 
-2756.892 16 
-3276.498 17 
 
In this case, the duration is 4 years 
representing the period at which the NPV is 
maximized for the financier. On the other hand, the 
corresponding incentive to sustain high effort 
provision from the entrepreneur, to this period by 
applying equation 13 is 90.70. 
 
4.1.2. Case 2: Fixing α and Negotiating on β 
 
Similarly, to Case 1, The NPV of the financier 
increases up to a certain duration period and then 
start to decrease. We can then calculate the duration 
and ultimately the corresponding incentive to 
sustain cooperation. 
 
Figure 2. NPV under different project life and Case 1 (Fixing α and negotiating on β) 
 
 
NPV Period 
85.874 1 
121.624 2 
112.914 3 
63.704 4 
-22.238 5 
-141.336 6 
-290.206 7 
-465.656 8 
-664.686 9 
-884.488 10 
-1122.446 11 
-1376.136 12 
-1643.326 13 
-1921.976 14 
-2210.238 15 
-2506.456 16 
-2809.166 17 
 
In this case, the duration is 2 years 
representing the period at which the NPV is 
maximized for the financier. On the other hand, the 
corresponding incentive to sustain high effort 
provision from the entrepreneur, to this period by 
applying equation 16 is 90.70. 
From the above two cases, we can see the 
implications of our model in terms of four concepts. 
First, the model allows for the flexibility in terms of 
negotiability. The parties can agree on fixing the 
contribution of each party in the equity and 
negotiating accordingly the profit-sharing ratio. Or 
alternatively, fix the profit-sharing ratio and 
negotiate on the capital contribution of each party. 
Second, the model depending on each case 
allows for gradually transferring project ownership 
to the entrepreneur (in case of the initial fixing of 
the capital contribution) and increasing the 
entrepreneur profit as an incentive to sustain 
cooperation (in the case of the initial fixing of the 
profit-sharing ratio). 
Third, the model allows for the calculation of 
the monetary incentive that can help in sustain 
cooperation (high entrepreneurial effort provision) 
over a certain period. 
Fourth, the model allows for the calculation of 
duration as the optimum life of the projects. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
We have tried to reduce the effort shirking of an 
entrepreneur by applying a specific incentive 
mechanism using game theory in a repeated 
framework. We started by establishing a one stage 
game under which a specific profit-sharing ratio is 
negotiated based on a given entrepreneur’s capital 
contribution. We reversed the case by negotiating 
the entrepreneurial capital contribution and fixing 
the profit-sharing ratio. The negotiation, in this case, 
was done in such a way that both participants are 
better off in a cooperation setting than in a 
defection setting. This mechanism was then 
extended to repeated framework were an incentive 
mechanism was the introduced to sustain 
cooperation. We found theoretical evidence that the 
introduction of such an incentive can induce 
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cooperation from the part of the entrepreneur. 
However, this incentive can only be given for a 
specific period before the financier’s NPV starts to 
drop. Indeed, we managed to find that period, called 
duration, for which the financier NPV is maximized. 
This duration can be proposed to be used as the 
optimum lifetime of the contract. 
This model can be extended using a double-
sided moral hazard where the effort of the financier 
and the entrepreneur are analysed to sustain 
cooperation. 
Since the model represents a repeated game, 
we propose extending an agent-based model to 
facilitate numerical analysis. 
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